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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SOUTHEAST FURNITURE COM-
PANY, 
Respondent_, 
vs. 
GRANI'TE HOLDING COMPANY, 
Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Brief 
No. 9175 
Respondent takes issue with most of the statements 
and the conclusions contained in Appellant's "Statement 
of Facts.'' 
There are some facts reflected by the record which 
are not in dispute, namely: The deed which appellant 
made and delivered to respondent at the time respond-
ent purchased the property now occupied by respondent's 
furniture store, contained a grant of a "floating" right 
of way, to be furnished to respondent by appellant (R. 
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140). The driveway as now located is 33 feet wide (north 
and south) and 170 feet long (east and west) enter-
ing McClelland Street on the west. It adjoins and runs 
parallel to a strip of ground owned by appellant on the 
north. The title to the east 40 feet of the driveway as 
now located is and has for many years been vested in 
appellant, and the title to the west 130 feet is vested in 
respondent, the same having been acquired by respondent 
from Clara L. Cracroft by deed on May 14th, 1941. 
Shortly after respondent acquired said property respond-
ent at its own expense hard-surfaced the driveway and 
respondent has ever since resurfaced and maintained 
the right of way without any part of such expense having 
been paid by appellant, respondent has paid all taxes 
on that part of the right of way title to which is vested 
in respondent. Appellant has never offered to pay any-
thing toward the maintenance of the driveway. (R. 149) 
It is evident that .appellant reserved, by its deed to 
respondent covering that property on which respond-
ent's business is operated which carried a right of way 
title to property running northerly and southerly along 
a railroad right of way, the right to relocate that right 
of way from time to time if and as the necessity or 
convenience of appellant or those claiming or to claim 
under appellant and its successors in estate shall require 
a deviation in the course or location of the driveway. 
(Ex. 1-P) 
The basic fact in dispute is the contention of appel-
lant that a representative of appellant corporation, Nephi 
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J. Hansen and a representative of respondent corpora-
tion, S. C. Sorensen, both of whom are now deceased, 
entered into an oral agreement in the year 1942 granting 
their respective corporations reciprocal easements over 
the driveway in dispute. 
The appellant has attempted to broaden the scope 
of its action beyond the limits of its pleadings by con-
tending for and producing purported evidence of an 
implied agreement, estoppel and dedication of a public 
way. Their motion to amend their pleading following 
the trial to include these other theories to establish a 
joint right of way was properly denied by the court. 
Before considering the points relied upon by Appel-
lant, we answer some other matters mentioned in Appel-
lant's "Statement of Facts.'' 
Appellant argues that the way has been used as a 
public street, but there is no evidence supporting such 
contention. The evidence shows that the public generally 
did not make use of the driveway, but the only ones 
making use thereof are appellant and appellant's tenants. 
Appellant's witnesses testified that they made use of 
the driveway for delivery purposes but their customers 
did not make use of it. (R. 142) 
'The record does not support the statement of appel-
lant on page 3 that the closing of the old right of way 
would relieve respondent from a possible encroachment 
claim by a land owner who stood to gain by the closing 
of the driveway. This statement is but a bare conclusion 
of appellant. 
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Appellant further states at page 3 of its brief that 
counsel for respondent agrees that if appellant had 
asked for a right of way deed at a conversation pur-
portedly had between the late Messrs. Hansen & Soren-
son, both deceased, that it would have been given, and 
therefore, it was so intended. In the first place we con-
tend the record is in error. It is respondent's contention 
that the word "you" was used by counsel for respondent 
in his cross examination of appellant's witness and not 
the word "I." Even if the record correctly reflected the 
question as recorded, it is evident that no deed was ever 
given, therefore, the right given by respondent to appel-
lant to use appellant's property was nothing more than 
a permissive right revocable at the will of respondent. 
Witness Hansen admits he should have asked for a deed 
to the right of way (R. 150). 
Neither does the record bear out the statement of 
appellant that the closing of that right of way conveyed 
by appellant to respondent irrevocably c1osed the right 
of way and extinguished the only means of access to 
McClelland from appellant's property. Appellants in 
anticipation of being called upon by respondent and 
others at some time, to perform under its deed and 
furnish a right of way by relocation, acquired property 
adjoining the present way on the North (R. 127, 128). 
Witness Richards and appellant had protected them-
selves against the possibility of being cut off from the 
present way. 
At page 8 of appellant's brief appellant states that 
it acquired the property adjoining the drive way here 
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in que:stion in desperation and as a possible escape in 
the event the respondent should prevail and to insure 
apJJellant's ability to perfonn its prior and long stand-
ing obligation to others to provide them a right of way. 
This argument is conceding the correctness of respond-
ent's position. One of those to whom appellant is obli-
gated to provide a right of way is respondent. 
Appellant states that if it is denied a permanent 
right over respondent's property it will be irreparably 
damaged. There is no showing in the record that appel-
lant would be damaged if it were denied the right to 
the use of respondent's property, appellant having made 
provisions to protect itself against damage by acquiring 
property adjoining that property here in question on 
the North. 
Appellant lays great weight to that evidence which 
the court permitted to come into the record over objec-
tion of counsel for respondent to the effect that in 1942 
an effort was made by the late Messrs. Hansen & 
Sorenson to have the way accepted by the city of Salt 
Lae City as a public street. 
There is nothing in the record which shows any 
transaction on the part of respondent company to take 
such action, there is no executed deed, there is no compe-
tent evidence to such effect, that evidence which was 
received is nothing but hearsay, and incompetent. If 
this evidence were to be given consideration, the logical 
conclusion would be that the Respondent sought the 
dedication in order to be relieved of the burden of main-
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tenance, for which it had the sole and exclusive responsi-
bility. 
At page 5 appellant states the evidence shows there 
were no signs posted on the property for more than 
10 years subsequent to 1952. Appellant's witnesses admit 
there was a sign posted in 1945 (R. 102). No objection 
was made by appellant when the sign was posted. Wit-
ness Bill Hansen testified that "he didn't feel it applied 
to us." (R. 146) 
The evidence that signs had been posted at the 
McClelland Street entrance to the way in 1945 is un-
contradicted, therefore, no legal rights had been acquired 
by appellant to that time unless the rights could be 
shown by oral agreement. 
At page 5 (R. 145) appellant makes it appear that 
bad feelings existed between officers of appellant and 
respondent, but we submit that the only evidence of dis-
agreement shown is that Bill Hansen, an officer of 
appellant company objected to Mr. H. A. Sorensen, an 
officer of respondent company, having hard topping 
put on that part of the driveway title to which is in 
appellant without first having obtained the consent of 
appellant, but nothing more. 
POINT I. 
Appellant's principal contention point I is based 
on its counterclaim Paragraph 2 at page 3 (R. 11, R. 
64) wherein appellant alleges as follows: 
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"It was further agreed that the right of way 
would be used and maintained by plaintiff and 
defendant jointly.'' 
It is admitted by appellant that it has paid nothing 
toward maintenance of the way (R. 149). Therefore, 
even provided appellant could establish the agreement 
contended for, by its own admission it failed to perform 
its part of the agreement. 
Appellant does not rely on a prescriptive right, but 
relies entirely on an oral agreement to establish a right 
of way to encumber the property of respondent with a 
permanent easement. In order to prove such an agree-
ment appellant relies on testimony of witnesses incompe-
tent under the laws of the State of Utah to testify. 
As to the competency of witnesses, Section 78-24-2 
(3) UCA 1953 on who may not be witnesses reads as 
follows: 
"A party to any civil action, suit, or pro-
ceeding, and any person directly interested in 
the event thereof, and any person from, through 
or under whom such party or interested person 
derived his interest, or title or any part thereof, 
when the adverse party in such action, suit or pro-
ceeding claims or opposes, sues or defends, as 
guardian of an insane or incompetent person, or as 
the executor or administrator, heir, legatee or 
devisee of any deceased person, or as guardian, 
assignee or grantee, directly or remotely, of such 
heir, legatee or devisee, as to any statement by, 
or transacmon with, such deceased, insane or 1m-
competent person, or matter of fact whatever, 
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whiJch must have been equally wiJthin the knowl-
edge of both the witness and such insa;ne, incompe-
tent or decease1d person, unless such w~tness ~s 
called to testify thereto by such adverse party so 
daimimg or opposing, su~ng or defending, ~n such 
actiJon, suit or procee,divng." (italics added) 
Timely objection was made to appellant's witnesses 
who were permitted to testify. The testimony given by 
appellant's witnesses clearly shows the importance of 
the rule and the reason for same. 
POINT II 
Under Point II appellant contends that by its having 
shown performance, on the part of appellant, of its 
obligation under the purported agreement by the removal 
of some sheds the statute of frauds does not apply. 
By appellant removing a few sheds appellant was 
only doing that which it was already legally obligated 
to do in furnishing that property over which the drive-
way was established for convenience. Because respond-
ent was at the time willing to permit the temporary use 
of its property in the relocation, even had there been 
an agreement as contended for by plaintiff, this does 
not constitute performance of the agreement contended 
for inasmuch as appellant was as heretofore stated, 
legally obligated to furnish a right of way to respondent, 
still such act on the part of respondent did not pass 
any legal right for a permanent use of respondent's 
property to appellant. 
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The attention of the Court is further directed to 
the fact that as heretofore stated, appellant admits by 
its pleadings that if an agreement had been entered into 
as contended for, appellant was obligated to pay a por-
tion of the maintenance of the driveway and appellant's 
witnesses admitted that appellant had paid nothing to-
ward such maintenance. 
It is most unreasonable to presume that respondent 
would give over four times more property than that given 
by appellant, pay taxes thereon and pay the total cost 
of improving and maintaining the driveway for the bene-
fit of appellant as is contended for by appellant. 
The cases cited by appellant under Point II are not 
applicable, because appellant did not show performance 
of an agreement which would take the case out of the 
statute of frauds. 
Under Section 25-5-1 UCA 1953 the law is stated 
as follows: 
"No estate or interest in real property, other 
than leases for a term not exceeding one year, 
nor any trust or power over or concerning real 
property or in any manner relating thereto, shall 
be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or de-
clared otherwise than by act or operation of law, 
or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed 
by the party creating, granting, assigning, sur-
rendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful 
agent thereunder authorized by writing." 
In 49 Am. J ur. - Statute of Frauds, Section 182 
at page 513 the law is stated as follows: 
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"It is universally held that an easement is 
an 'interest' within the meaning of statutes which 
follow in effect the English statute prohibiting 
the creation by parol of any 'interest' in real 
property and requiring any contract for the sale 
of any 'interest' therein to be in writing, and 
therefore, that the creation of an agreement to 
create an easement is within the statute." 
Had it not been evident that appellant was legally 
obligated under its deed to respondent to furnish re-
sepondent with a right of way and had appellant and its 
successors not reserved the right by said deed to relocate 
the right of way, then appellant's position and argument 
might carry some weight, but appellant cannot ignore 
its obligation to respondent under the provision of its 
deed. 
POINT III 
As to appellants Point III on Estoppel, the cases 
relied upon and the argument made by appellant might 
apply to that case where there appeared no legal obli-
gation on the part of the party who would invoke the 
rule to furnish a right of way, but the same do not apply 
to the case at issue. 
The fact that respondent officers might have ob-
served tearing down of some sheds by appellant could 
not under any circumstance of this case act to estop 
respondent from defending its title to its land when 
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appellant was already obligated by deed to furnish re-
~pondent with a right of way. 
Appellant argues that the sign 1n evidence (Ex. 
P. 5) is not that sign first posted on the property. The 
sign which is in evidence bears the same wording as 
one previously placed at the entrance of the driveway 
as was testified to by witness, J. Gordon Sorenson 
(R. 161). 
POINT IV 
The same argument which is made to appellant's 
Point III is applicable to its Point IV. 
POINT V 
As to Point V of appellant's brief, there is no pre-
sumption that a right to use respondents property exists 
inasmuch as the use has not been for the statutory 
period, this even if no sign had been posted on the 
property. Therefore the evidence to establish appellant's 
claim of an agreement must be clear and convincing. 
The law is jealous of a claim to an easement, 28 CJS 
Sec. 68. P. 734. 
Appellant has not shown that the way is by neces-
sity. Appellant has not pleaded nor relied on a right 
of way by necessity but relies wholly on an oral agree-
ment. 
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Appellant has not cited a Utah case in support of its 
argument under Point V and it is our opinion that the 
Utah Courts have not adopted the rule of law relied on 
by appellant but on the contrary our courts have re-
quired one relying on use or on implied agreement to 
have made use of the way adversely to the owner of 
the servient estate for the required period to have ac-
quired a right of way by prescription. 
The Utah cases cited by appellant under its Point 
V are not in point, the cases cited apply to boundary 
line cases and not rights of way. 
POINT VI 
As stated under respondent's opening argument 
there is no competent evidence to support appellant's 
argument under its Point VI. There is no evidence of 
public use of the way as contended to establish a 
right of way under Section 27-1-2 UCA 1953 but on the 
contrary appellant's witnesses testified that its tenants 
used the same, but not the customers of its tenants. The 
evidence even if admissible would show that the city 
refused to accept the way as a dedicated public thorough-
fare and therefore if there was an agreement made by 
the officers of appellant and respondent to dedicate the 
way as a public street the same failed. 
POINT VII 
Much of appellant's argument under its Point VII 
is not supported by evidence, but contrary to the argu-
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ment of appellant the evidence which is corroborated 
by one of appellant's own witnesses is to the effect that 
signs were posted for 1nany years, in fact from the 
time of acquisition by respondent of its property. Appel-
lant's witness, Richards, even testified to a chain having 
been placed across the way at a point where appellant's 
property adjoined the property of respondent (R. 119). 
POINT VIII 
Regarding Point VIII the record shows a default 
certificate having been entered on October 22, 1958 but 
judgment was not entered until January 27, 1959. Re-
spondent's Motion to set aside the default judgment 
was filed February 6, 1959 which was well within the 
three (3) month period provided under Rule 60 b. Appel-
lant would have the court read into Rule 60 b the word 
"default" where the word ''judgment" appears. 
Attention is here directed to the fact that the default 
was entered on a counterclaim. A counterclaim on which 
appellant's action is predicated which was not served 
on respondent as required by Rule 5 but the same was 
mailed to the attorney for respondent. 
The courts do not favor judgments by default (Utah 
Com. & Sav. vs. Trumbo, 17 U 198 footnoted under Rule 
55 (a) (1). Especially is this true of defaults entered 
on counterclaims where as in this case it is evident that 
respondent had a meritorious defense to the counter-
claim. Then too, it is clearly evident that that which 
appellant calls a counterclaim was not in fact a counter-
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claim, it added nothing new to that pleading which 
appellant had already filed as its answer. That is to 
say while the answer of appellant as amended does 
contain that which they title a counterclaim, technically 
it is not a counterclaim at all and requires no answer. 
Then too, while we are mindful of the fact that 
it is the practice among attorneys here in this district 
to but mail a counterclaim to counsel of record for 
respondent, still such service does not meet the require-
ment of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 5 (b) 
( 1) permitting service upon a party by mailing to his 
attorney is not applicable where a counterclaim is inter-
posed. 
In further support of this statement we cite Rule 
55 (a) (2) which reads as follows: 
''Notice to Party of Default. After the entry 
of the default on any party, as provided in sub-
division (a) (1) of this rule, it shall not be neces-
sary to give such party in default any notice or 
paper otherwise required by these rules to be 
served on a party to the action or proceeding, 
except as prov~ded i'n Rule 5 (a)." 
And we find Rule 5 (a) reading as follows : Service. 
When Required. 
"Every order required by its terms to be 
served, every pleading subsequent to the original 
complaint unless the court otherwise orders be-
cause of numerous defendants, every written 
motion other than one which may be heard ex 
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parte, and every written notice, appearance, de-
nland, offer of judg1nent, designation of record 
on appeal, and other papers requiring service 
shall be served upon each of the parties affected 
thereby, but no service need be made on part~es 
in default or fiailure to appear except that plead-
ings asserting new or additional claims for relief 
against them shall be served upon them in the 
manner provided for service of summons in 
Rule 4." 
If the counterclaim does in fact assert a new or 
additional claim for relief on behalf of defendant and 
against plaintiff then the counterclaim must be served 
upon the plaintiff as a summons is served and not upon 
its attorney by mailing a copy thereof to the attorney. 
"The allowance of a vacation of a judgment 
is a creature of equity designed to relieve 
against harshness of enforcing a judgment which 
may occur through procedural difficulties, the 
wrongs of the opposing party or misfortunes 
which prevent the presentation of a claim or 
defense." 
Citing Warren vs Dixon, U t.ah, 260 P2d 7 41. 
The Warren case further states as annotated: "The 
rule that the courts will incline towards granting relief 
to a party who has not had an opportunity to present his 
case is ordinarily applied at the trial court level." 
In the vV arren case the court speaking through Mr. 
Justice ~IcDonough says at page 7 43 : 
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"The difficulty facing the trial court upon 
a motion to vacate the judgment lies in the fact 
that a compromise between two valid considera-
tions must be selected. A rule which would per-
mit the re-opening of cases previously decided 
because of error or ignorance during the progress 
of the trial would in a large measure vitiate 
the affects of res judicata and create a hardship 
to the successful litigant in causing him to prose-
cute his action more than once and possibly lose 
the ability to collect his judgment; on the other 
hand, the court is .anxious to protect the losing 
party who has not had the opport111Ybity to present 
his claim or defense. Discretion must be exer-
cised in furtherance of justice and the court will 
incline toward grantzng relief in a .doubtful cas~e 
~o the end that the pa·rty may have a henring. 
Otting Hurd v. For.d, 74 Utah 46. (Italics added). 
There can he no hardship claimed by appellant in 
the instant case nor is appellant in any danger of loosing 
any right to collect its judgment should the Court grant 
Respondent's motion, there being no money judgment 
involved. 
In the Hur.d v. Ford case we find 8 of the syllabus 
reading as follows : 
"Judgment-Discretion to relieve from Default 
judgment 1nust be exercised in furtherance of 
Justice, and Court will Incline toward granting 
relief in doubtful case ( Comp. Laws 1917, Sec. 
6619). 1The discretion lodged in court by Comp. 
Laws 1917, Sec. 6619, to set aside default or re-
lieve party from default judgment, is to be exer-
cised in furtherance of justice, and court will 
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incline toward granting relief in doubtful case to 
end that party Inay have a hearing." 
Now Hule 60 b is substantially the smne as former 
seetion 104-14-4 Utah Code 1943 and we find section 
1-l:-1-l:--l- taken frmn Sec. 6619, Laws of Utah, 1917. 
Our Courts have said no general rule can be laid 
down respecting discretion to be exercised by trial court 
in setting aside or refusing to set aside judgment by 
default; each case must necessarily depend on its own 
peculiar facts and circumstances, but .discretion sho~tld 
always be so exercised ras to promote ends of j1tstice. 
In Ut.ah Commercial & Savings Bk. v Trumbo, 17 
U. 198, 53 P. 1033, the law is stated as follows: 
"Power of trial court to set aside judgments 
by default should be exercised liberally to end 
that causes may be tried on their merits, and 
where circumstances which led to default are 
such as to cause court to hesitate, doubt should 
be resolved in favor of application for setting 
aside judgment rendered on default." 
In footnote to Rule 55 (a) ( 1) note 10 we find the 
following: 
"While granting or refusing applications to 
open and set aside defaults is addressed to court's 
sound discretion, yet power should be exercised 
freely and liberally." 
Our Courts have not deviated from the rule of 
law laid down in the setting aside of defaults. 
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There is nothing in the instant case from which 
appellant could have assumed that plaintiff had aban-
doned its case even though appellant argues the matter 
had been pending since 1954. It is evident there has 
been negotiations for settlement between the parties for 
many years and even after the ease found its way into 
the office of the present counsel for appellant. Counsel 
for appellant argues that respondent did nothing to 
press the case to conclusion. What prejudice has appel-
lant shown in the case not having been brought to trial 
sooner~ None at all. Had respondent pressed the case 
for trial at a time and before the counter-claim of appel-
lant was filed which was not filed until a few months 
before trial, respondent would not have been faced with 
the necessity of this proceeding. If there was any pre-
judice because of delay it appears that respondent is 
the one who has been prejudiced in being forced to a 
trial of the case. 
POINT IX 
As to Point IX, if error was committed by the trial 
court it was prejudicial to respondent and not to appel-
lant. All the evidence offered by appellant vv-as received 
over objection of counsel for respondent and it must 
be presumed inasmuch as the court did not rule out 
the evidence that the court considered same. 
POINT X 
Regarding Point X, appellant contends that the 
court erred in not finding on all issues before the court. 
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The court found there was no agreement to create a 
joint right of way. This was the only issue raised by 
the pleadings which was before the court. The court 
denied appellant's motion to amend its complaint and 
therefore there was no issue as to the contention of 
appellant that there was a dedicated public thoroughfare. 
There is ample evidence in the record to support 
the findings of the court, the only issue before the court 
being whether there was an oral agreement entered into 
between appellant and respondent to encumber respond-
nt's property with a permanent right of way. 
CON·CLUSION 
Appellant failed to establish by a preponderance of 
evidence that there was an oral agreement between 
appellant and respondent to burden respondent's land 
with a permanent right of way. The court properly 
entered judgment finding and determining that there was 
no such agreement. 
The judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MILTON V. BACKMAN of 
Backman, Backman & Clark, 
ALTON C. MEL VILLE, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
